

Where Self-Interest Trumps Ideology: Liberal Homeowners and Local Opposition to Housing Development

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Abstract

Survey researchers have found that economic self-interest does little to shape political attitudes. But such conclusions are often based on opinions about policies that present low stakes to voters. We examine an issue that presents a harder test of self-interest: whether to build more dense housing in one's area. Such development facilitates local housing affordability, but threatens homeowners' property values. Liberal homeowners, especially, then face a dilemma between promoting housing affordability and protecting home values. In a survey of U.S. metropolitan areas, we find that self-interest, not ideology, dominates homeowner attitudes. Two survey experiments show that liberal homeowners are barely more likely than conservatives to support dense housing. Emphasizing housing development's effects on affordability further reduces their support, while additionally highlighting benefits to low-income families does little to increase support. Our results show how self-interest manifests in local contexts and can jeopardize national policy goals.

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Can economic self-interest influence policy attitudes? Political scientists have long puzzled over the reasons that Americans appear to adopt policy attitudes and voting behavior that run counter to their economic well-being. From the earliest days of the modern survey era, political scientists have accumulated evidence that Americans have incoherent ideologies, and, critically, that their vote choice is driven by factors related to group identity and socialization, and excludes economic class and rational assessment of economic self-interest (Campbell et al., 1960; Achen and Bartels, 2016). Voters' apparent deviation from self-interested behavior has led scholars to develop a host of explanations, including voter ignorance (Bartels, 2005, 2008), altruistic personality traits (Gilens and Thal, 2017), and even "false consciousness" deriving from religion or cultural and racial identity (Frank, 2004). Others have argued that acting against one's self-interest may be the result of material sufficiency: educated, affluent voters are able to focus on "post-materialist" considerations and ignore their economic status (Inglehart, 1981; Gelman et al., 2007).

But most of the conclusions drawn in this sphere have been based on research into partisan vote choice and on voter attitudes towards federal economic policies that rarely threaten voters' economic standing. And studies that do find an effect of self-interest—such as in the political engagement of program-dependent issue publics (Campbell, 2003)—frequently reveal a central role for economic self-interest precisely because the personal stakes are very large. In this article, we show that economic self-interest plays out in an important policy domain that receives scant attention in federal policy debates: the politics surrounding whether to allow construction of dense, sometimes low-income, housing in Americans' communities. The politics of local housing development has been treated as "local politics," despite its significance for the national expansion of economic opportunity. But these local concerns are at the center of Americans' daily lives, and the self-interest of homeowners is, as a result, a major obstacle to the pursuit of national liberal economic goals. Local restrictions on multifamily housing development limit lower- and middle-income households' access to high-income, high employment metropolitan areas and suburban job centers (Downs, 1973; Danielson, 1976; Wilson, 1996; Rothstein, 2017; Trounstein, 2018).

Such policies create an especially difficult challenge for liberal homeowners, who are happy to embrace the principle of liberal housing policy and equal housing opportunity, but do not support the building of needed housing in their own communities. Despite their other redistributive commitments, liberal homeowners are more likely than renters, and almost as likely as conservative homeowners, to oppose development of apartments and similar higher-density housing. Even for homeowners who embrace liberal national housing goals (such as a federal guarantee of housing for all), the risks associated with high-density housing construction in their communities may offset the utility they might obtain from seeing liberal policies enacted.¹ The correct left position—supporting the ideal of a positive right to housing—implies the need for construction of additional, and dense, apartment-style housing. However, such development may undermine otherwise ideologically consistent views, as homeowners who perceive threats to their self-interest oppose needed development. The literature on the importance of homeownership to local political behavior—so called “homevoting”—has amply demonstrated homeowners’ self-interested engagement in local politics (Fischel, 2001; Oliver and Ha, 2007; Einstein, Palmer and Glick, 2018; Hall and Yoder, 2018), but has not addressed how homeowners cope with conflicts between ideological principles and self-interest. Homeowners’ dilemma might be considered an example of the “principle-policy puzzle” under which Americans support specific political ideals but balk at the (often local) policies needed to implement them.² Their behavior often reduced to the disparaging term “not in my backyard” (NIMBYism), liberal homeowners test the degree to which Americans stand by political principles in the face of economic threat.

We demonstrate the centrality of self-interest to homeowners handling of the principle-policy dilemmas associated with housing development. For purposes of this paper, we define “liberals” as those who endorse the policy principle that the federal government should guarantee housing for everyone, and “conservatives” as those neutral or opposed. We then examine their support for various policies that

¹This differs from the “spatial collective action problem” describe in Hankinson (2018), in the sense that homeowners, unlike renters, rarely stand to benefit economically from construction of new housing.

²For example, it has been argued that some voters are racially liberal in principle only, and balk at reparative policies (Jackman, 1978). Stouffer’s (1955) study on Americans’ civil liberties attitudes demonstrated she same (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1993: Ch. 4).

might be seen as contributing to the general goal of providing housing for all. We show that homeowners and renters alike are responsive to policies that aid or threaten their self-interest, regardless of their stated policy principles. Liberal homeowners, who appear to be the most conflicted group, express relatively more support for regulatory and redistributive housing policies that impose few direct costs on homeowners. However, they act like conservative homeowners when presented policies to enable more housing development in their communities. We also find evidence of an asymmetry in the clash between self-interest and ideology: for conservative homeowners, opposition to egalitarian and urbanizing housing policies is consistent with their other preferences; they tend to oppose dense and affordable housing in general, and not only if it is proposed in their “backyard.” It is liberals who face a potentially difficult clash between self-interest and ideological commitment.³

We test the clash of self-interest and ideological commitment in two survey experiments, which show that liberal and conservative homeowners differ around housing-related social policy but substantially agree around housing development questions. While conservative homeowners strongly oppose dense housing, and liberal renters are very supportive, we find that liberal homeowners face cross-pressuring considerations. In the first survey experiment, we asked respondents a battery of questions about their support for building more of five different housing types in their area. Liberal homeowners were less supportive of apartments and other higher-density housing forms than were liberal renters. We attempted to influence support for housing development among both renters and homeowners by informing respondents of housing development’s likely effects on housing prices. Other respondents were randomly assigned to receive additional information about development’s benefits for housing affordability for low- and middle-income families. We found that persuasive messages had little effect among liberal homeowners, and in some cases backfired by reducing support for development. Consistent with past research on local self-interest, conservative homeowners are unresponsive to most treatments, as they

³Conservative renters (who constitute about 13% of our sample) may also face cognitive dissonance, as they may dislike dense and urban housing but benefit from the reduced prices associated with additional housing development.

are generally more opposed to urbanism and dense housing.⁴ In the second experiment, we presented respondents a more direct test of self-interest by addressing factors that increase or reduce “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) behavior around a specific, hypothetical 120-unit local apartment housing development. We gave respondents different information about their home’s distance to the project and the types of tenants expected to occupy the housing. While liberal homeowners were more likely than conservative homeowners to support construction of low-income apartments, they were still more opposed to apartments than were renters. With only a few exceptions, liberal homeowners were less supportive of apartment development than were renters of all political stripes.

Our results demonstrate that homeownership is a major manifestation of self-interest in American politics, affecting how policy principles translate into support for specific policies. Homeownership does not just cause ideological shifts to the right or left that might be attributed to people treating their home as another financial asset or burden (e.g., Ansell, 2014), the stakes involved in one’s place of residence are unique. Liberal homeowners who otherwise embrace liberal economic policies behave almost like conservatives on questions pertaining to local housing development specifically. Our results demonstrate that self-interest defines public opinion towards housing policy, especially dominating attitudes towards policies that affect home values.

Ideology, Self-Interest, and the Significance of Housing Politics

The spatial distribution of affordable housing affects the spatial distribution of economic opportunity. This makes the politics of housing an ideal test case for examining the clash between self-interest and support for egalitarian principles. The national housing debate has recently focused on the origin, and importance, of local housing development restrictions and their effects on Americans’ access to high-

⁴Our results align with the classic findings in Sears, Hensler and Speer (1979), who find that white opposition to school desegregation “busing” was not greater among white parents who anticipated that their children might be subjected to such programs, as their conservative attitudes were already set. However, Green and Cowden (1992) show how those subjected to such policies were more likely to engage in protest against the policies. See also Einstein, Palmer and Glick (2018).

growth metropolitan areas and the economic opportunities therein. Restrictive zoning laws limit geographic mobility, yielding aggregate and distributional economic consequences. Hsieh and Moretti (2017), for example, estimate that constraints on housing supply caused largely by local development restrictions halved aggregate GDP growth between 1964 and 2009. Such laws also prevented migration from low-productivity to high-productivity metropolitan areas. It has been argued that, as a result, the convergence of American states' economic performance that characterized much of the 20th century was interrupted in the 1980s (Ganong and Shoag, 2017; see also Berry and Glaeser, 2005). The cost burdens resulting from local housing development restrictions are especially acute in cities such as New York, Boston, Seattle, and San Francisco, where restrictive zoning prevents construction of the apartment and condo developments that provide a gateway to the residential housing market. Combined with massive job growth, prices in such cities have grown well beyond the reach of the middle class. In San Francisco, for example, the Zillow Price Index grew by 93% between 2011 and 2018, and the median one-bedroom apartment posed a financial burden to anyone earning anything less than \$136,000 per year.⁵ While zoning reforms are only one possible remedy, removing obstacles to construction of multi-family housing is a goal widely endorsed by housing opportunity advocates.

The politics of local development have become an unsettled issue on the political left and within the Democratic Party. While Americans have been adopting increasingly party-consistent left-right positions on economic and social issues (Levendusky, 2009), often following the leads of party elites (Lenz, 2009, 2013), local housing development has not produced such easy signals, and absent clear national cues, economic self-interest will fill the void. In recent years, however, local housing restrictions have received greater attention, even leading Obama Administration officials to issue public statements against restrictive local zoning laws in late 2016 (*Housing Development Toolkit*, 2016; Woellert, 2016). These recent elite partisan cues raise the prospect that liberal homeowners, especially, might begin to experience cognitive dissonance related to their party's policy goals. Many of the metropolitan areas

⁵<http://www.zillow.com/san-francisco-ca/home-values> and <https://sf.curbed.com/2018/4/2/17189322/san-francisco-apartment-rent-april-2018>. Accessed August 25, 2018. We define housing costs as burdensome if they exceed 30 percent of pre-tax income.

with the most severe housing restrictions are homogeneously Democratic (Kahn, 2011), with voters and elected officials alike supporting renter-friendly aid policies but disagreeing over development of both affordable and market-rate housing.

Debates over local housing policy rebut the idea that self-interest is irrelevant to politics, and suggest that such conclusions reflect researchers' failure to correctly measure threats to their self-interest. Unfortunately, much of our research on policy attitudes requires voters to consider vaguely defined costs and benefits. For example, our conclusions about public spending attitudes are often based on question batteries, such as those on the General Social Survey that ask whether respondents support more spending in areas such as "welfare" or "roads and bridges" (Smith, Marsden and Hout, 2015). While such questions are valid for measurement of left-right ideology, but can poorly account for the costs and benefits faced by individuals (Citrin and Green, 1990; Chong, Citrin and Conley, 2001). By framing questions in terms of policy goals (for example, federal enforcement of employment nondiscrimination), questions often avoid the assessing attitudes towards implementing policies (for example, fines or criminal prosecution for small businesses that violate fair employment laws). Seemingly altruistic or non-self-interested responses may not stem from ignorance or conscious disregard of individuals' naively constructed self-interest, but from survey researchers' failure to capture self-interest. By contrast, questions about housing development illustrate how Americans may hold a seemingly ideological position on vaguely specified policy desiderata, but deviate from their ideology when presented specific or costly means of implementation. Their self-interest, made especially salient by the unique affinity people feel for their home, may lead to more self-interested policy attitudes and voting (Citrin and Green, 1990).⁶ In fact, we should expect the threshold at which self-interest overrides voters' articulated principles to be lower in contexts such as personal homeownership that might seem divorced from national politics.

To test for the importance of self-interest, we are especially concerned with how self-interest may shape voters' attitudes in spite of their stated political principles. First, liberal homeowners may suffer cognitive dissonance over the disagreement between their principles on housing policy and the local rules

⁶See also Strauss (2009), who finds that personal experience (in which we include homeownership) can override partisan biases.

needed to protect their economic self-interest. Their level of dissonance is likely to vary depending on the degree to which they are reminded of the competing considerations and forced to bring them to mind. They may reduce their remaining dissonance by assigning heavier weight to the concerns correlated with home value. Second, household-level concerns that animate homeowners' self-interest may short-circuit the dissonance-generating process by superseding personal political principles. In fact, personal concerns associated with one's place of residence—such as neighborhood safety, privacy, and school quality—may be so substantial that they override cognitive dissonance and associated discomfort (Festinger, 1962). Homeowners who have sunk substantial costs into a home will already have identified concerns that they consider before their second-order political commitments (Mummolo and Nall, 2017). They may see development of apartments and other high-density housing as threatening these priorities. A third way that housing may induce additional self-interested behavior is that homeowners may sense a lack of procedural fairness in regulatory changes. Zoning variances and conditional use permits—exceptions to standing zoning laws often needed to enable dense housing—as a de facto breach of contract. This sense that local development is “unfair” appears in local campaign rhetoric around development proposals, and may engender opposition out of proportion to the magnitude of the perceived economic threat. Faced with such proceedings, homeowners may not be concerned with a proximate development threat, but the personal risk produced by unpredictable, ad hoc changes to local zoning rules.

The conflict between ideology and self-interest may induce diverse reactions. It is unlikely that individuals who face a material conflict between their national political ideology and homeowner interest will immediately change their broader ideological commitments. While homeownership is correlated with more conservative policy views, a recent within-subject design using administrative (voter file) data indicates that homeownership has small effects on partisan electoral participation but leads individuals to engage to a greater extent with local tax and development issues specifically (Hall and Yoder, 2018). We hypothesize that homeownership leads voters to adopt self-interested positions on local housing policies while minimally adjusting their attitudes on national issues.

To the extent homeownership does cause homeowners to experience cognitive dissonance around local housing policy, they may alleviate their dissonance not by changing their attitudes towards nati-

onal housing goals, but by rationalizing their self-interest. One way they may do so is by arguing for homeownership's community benefits. Homeownership is said to result in pro-social, communitarian behavior (Fischel, 2001). Indeed, these alleged positive externalities justify federal programs that subsidize homeownership (McCabe, 2016: Ch. 3). Homeowners' efforts to increase the local quality of life and maintain the local property tax base can lead to better collective outcomes for *incumbent* residents. While such seemingly prosocial behaviors might be derided as "NIMBYism," housing opponents defending their "neighborhood character" (Ross, 2015) may instead consider this progressive and communitarian behavior. Indeed, anti-development campaigns led by liberal and conservatives alike have raised concerns over the alleged depredations inflicted on communities by for-profit housing developers and local "growth machines" (Molotch, 1976).⁷

Alternatively, homeowners may avoid dissonance entirely by conceiving of local housing development questions as a distinctly local and "non-political" process. Depending on how individuals prioritize features of their residential quality of life, they can disregard political and social commitments altogether through a process of "elimination by aspects" (Tversky, 1972; Mummolo and Nall, 2017). Homeowners may construe neighborhood zoning as a collective property right shared among neighborhood members, and a natural feature of owning property (Fischel, 1987). In the process, they may dissociate the local policies and associated benefits from broader social policy goals entirely. The historical record offers examples involving housing and other local issues. For example, during the Civil Rights era, white liberal Boston suburbs supported voluntary and incremental school busing programs, acknowledging the

⁷In a survey we conducted in Silicon Valley in October 2016, respondents gave real estate developers feeling thermometer scores lower than other polarizing or controversial groups, including undocumented immigrants and tech workers. Empirical support for the community benefits of home ownership is limited. Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) write that the positive social externalities of homeownership are "far too small to justify the [home mortgage interest] deduction." McCabe (2016) concludes that prosocial behaviors attributed to homeownership are mostly attributable to residential stability, not property ownership. Monkkonen and Manville (N.d.) further address the role of anti-developer attitudes in housing development debates.

discriminatory foundations of racial segregation and the possible benefits of integration. However, they did not support radically integrating their suburban communities or forfeiting control of their land development and school policies (Geismer, 2014). During the New Deal Era, northern liberals supported the Fair Employment Practices Commission (Schickler, 2016), a federal policy implemented to ensure equal employment opportunity, even as the white workers in Northern cities massively resisted proposals for racially integrated housing in their own neighborhoods or labor union locals (Sugrue, 1995, 2005; Frymer, 2011). Americans may indeed view national politics as a “sideshow” in their lives (Dahl, 2005). But this changes when national policies reach the center stage of their own communities (Green and Cowden, 1992).

While we are unable to test all of the mechanisms by which liberals would oppose housing development, the above models suggest that homeowner self-interest is likely to dominate local development politics, offsetting and in some cases overwhelming left economic ideology.

Data and Empirical Hypotheses

To assess the importance of self-interest in American housing policy, we conducted a survey of $n = 4,000$ voting-eligible persons (citizens over 18) in the 20 largest U.S. metropolitan areas (MSAs).⁸ Many of these metropolitan areas have suffered rising housing prices that have disproportionately stressed the finances of low- and middle-income people, prompting them to limit their search for jobs and residences. In high-growth areas, housing costs are a regular topic of conversation. Housing development is relevant

⁸These areas were: New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA; Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA; Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI; Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX; Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX; Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD; Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE; Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL; Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA; Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH; San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA; Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ; Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA; Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI; Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA; Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI; San Diego-Carlsbad, CA; Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL; Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO; and St. Louis, MO-IL.

even in lower-growth metropolitan areas, where restrictive zoning excludes poorer renters from suburban job centers (Wilson, 1996). We quota-sampled respondents to match the aggregated demographics of the MSAs included in each Census region.⁹

After screening respondents with respect to demographics, we asked respondents a series of questions on partisanship and economic ideology. The most important of these questions, used in the remainder of the paper, tested their support for the principle of housing as a federally guaranteed right. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a five-point (Likert) support scale with respect to the following statement: “Some people say the federal government should ensure that all Americans have housing. Others say that shouldn’t be a concern of the federal government.” A response to this question indicates support for an activist federal role in housing, but does not specify preferred policies to that end. Hereafter, we interchangeably refer to individuals who strongly or somewhat agree with the statement as “liberal,” or “pro-guarantee,” and those opposed or neutral as “conservative,” or “anti-guarantee.”¹⁰

The housing guarantee variable was interacted with housing tenure (homeownership status) to define a two-by-two moderator for use in analysis of the two survey experiments. Table 1 presents our

⁹Within Census regions, we sought to match the demographic distributions of the Current Population Survey November 2014 voting supplement (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2014). For the population living within all selected MSAs in each Census region, we matched the marginal distributions for each of the following variables, organized into quota categories: age (18-24, 25-44, 45-64 and 65+), sex, race/ethnicity (Asian only, black only, non-Hispanic white only, Hispanic, and multiracial/other), income (5 categories with a top code at \$75,000 per year), and MSA. The quota-sampling was administered by Qualtrics. The Online Appendix (p. 6) lists sample demographics and quota targets. To identify eligible respondents, we presented multiple screening questions at the beginning of the survey.

¹⁰Earlier drafts of this paper instead used a general redistributive index constructed from questions including: whether the government should reduce income differences; whether people are better off under a free market; and whether the government should redistribute income through heavy taxes on the rich. Our composite measure of liberal economic ideology and the housing guarantee item are correlated at $r = .53$.

	Homeowners	Renters
Anti-Housing Guarantee (Conservative)	Consonant	Potential Dissonance
Pro-Housing Guarantee (Liberal)	Potential Dissonance	Consonant

Table 1: Two-by-two typology of homeowners and renters, by support for a federal housing guarantee, displaying expected level of cognitive dissonance prompted by proposals for dense local housing development.

two-by-two typology of respondents according to this objective measure of self-interest and their ideology. Across our analyses, we expected liberal (pro-housing-guarantee) homeowners to exhibit behavior consistent with cognitive dissonance caused by the clash of principle and self-interest. We expected that the relationship between homeownership and policy attitudes would be heterogeneous, and would be stronger when (1) the threat was objectively large and (2) individuals were not already ideologically predisposed against the housing policies in question. We might expect only certain groups to respond to additional messaging. Neither liberal renters nor conservative owners were expected to change their attitudes in response to messages emphasizing development’s effect on housing prices and on housing opportunity. Conservative renters, a small fraction of our sample, may still express concerns around housing and quality of life that are not rooted in financial self-interest.¹¹

We reveal the extent of homeowners’ conflict between principle and self-interest in three different analyses. First, using the two-by-two typology presented in Table 1, we present results from an observational analysis of attitudes towards proposed state and local remedies to the housing affordability crisis. We find that liberal and conservative homeowners are both less likely than renters to endorse renter aid policies. While liberal homeowners are more willing to support such policies, they and conservative homeowners agree in their opposition to pro-development policies.

We then present results from two survey experiments designed to test messages related to housing. These experiments each test homeownership’s centrality to liberals’ response to housing.

¹¹One might think that pro-market libertarians ought to be important to our logic: renters who benefit from additional development and oppose government regulation on principle should also oppose zoning limits. However, empirically, this group makes up a small proportion of the population. Our reanalysis of an April 2015 Golden State Poll found that only 10% of California voters oppose liberal housing aid programs while also supporting dense housing development (Hoover Institution, 2015).

The first survey experiment tested the role of ideology and self-interest in general terms, assessing the extent to which people favor construction of five different types of housing “in their area” after they have viewed informational and persuasive messages similar to those presented by housing development advocates. We expected that pro-guarantee homeowners would be less likely than pro-guarantee renters to support apartments and other development, and that reminding respondents of local housing development’s price effects could produce two divergent reactions. On the one hand, if liberals’ ideological principles were dominant, such messages could have increased support for housing development among liberals, with uncertain effects on conservatives, who embrace free markets but dislike residential density (Pew Research Center, 2014). On the other hand, we expected messages emphasizing housing development’s effects to activate economic self-interest among both groups. For this reason, one of our messaging treatments included additional persuasive language on the affordability benefits to lower- and middle-income families to appeal to their pro-redistribution ideology and engender more support for dense development.

Our second survey experiment examines the same issues with greater specificity, evaluating responses to a hypothetical 120-unit apartment development project. Each respondent was randomly assigned to one of six proposals, varying whether the the project would include low-income or market-rate units, and varying the information about the project’s distance to the respondent’s home. We then asked respondents to report their support on a four-point scale. While conservative homeowners were expected to oppose apartment-style development projects regardless of the population served or the location, we expected to find that liberal homeowners would express more conflicted views. The logic of NIMBYism—that individuals respond negatively to bearing spatially concentrated costs of development but would tolerate imposition of costs on more distant neighbors—suggests that liberal homeowners will endorse low-income housing projects, but do so to a greater degree if the projects are not in their own neighborhood.

Collectively, our two experiments allow us to assess the extent to which countervailing emphases on economic self-interest and towards local housing policy.

Assessing Varied Attitudes Towards Housing Policy

To examine self-interest's importance to housing policy attitudes, we first report observational data on liberals' and conservatives', homeowners' and renters' attitudes towards various state and local policies related to renter aid and protections, land use, and development rules. Among the policies designed to aid and protect renters were measures to reduce discrimination against low-income housing voucher recipients; combat housing discrimination; issue tax credits to renters; and expand local rent control. Policies supporting general high-density development included: relaxing state environmental limits; giving neighborhoods a greater role in development decisions (a policy construable as anti-development); requiring local governments to allow the construction of apartments; changing local laws to allow more construction; and allowing expanded development of housing in open space.¹²

To observe differences in policy attitudes among demographically comparable renters and homeowners across the nine policies, we estimated the following linear probability model predicting the individual support for each policy:

$$Y_{ik} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 G_i + \beta_2 H_i + \beta_3 G_i \times H_i + \mathbf{X}_i' \delta + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where Y_{ik} is a binary outcome variable indicating respondent i supports policy k , G_i is a binary variable coded 1 if the respondent opposed or was neutral with respect to a federal housing guarantee for all, and H_i was coded 1 if the respondent reported owning their home. Our two main independent variables were interacted to assess how self-interest and homeownership vary by policy type. A vector of additional

¹²Unfortunately, few questions on major national surveys, including on the General Social Survey, have pertained to housing development. Instead, they ask about sentiment towards density versus sprawl (Pew Research Center, 2014), or ask about racial composition of one's neighbors (Farley et al., 1978, 1994) or levels of support for housing non-discrimination. Work by Hankinson (2018) and others has increased political scientists' attention to these issues. By using the Golden State Poll housing survey as a baseline (Hoover Institution, 2015), we capitalized on prior knowledge of support for development policies in leading metropolitan areas, a number of which are in California.

Policy	Pro-guarantee homeowners	Anti- guarantee homeowners	Difference
Require accepting Section 8 tenants (state)	-0.06 (0.023)	-0.33 (0.023)	0.26 (0.019)
Pass rent control (local)	-0.09 (0.022)	-0.32 (0.023)	0.23 (0.020)
Tax credits for renters (state)	-0.22 (0.022)	-0.42 (0.022)	0.20 (0.019)
Require local govts allow apts (state)	-0.15 (0.023)	-0.31 (0.022)	0.17 (0.018)
Combat housing discrimination (state)	-0.04 (0.019)	-0.19 (0.021)	0.15 (0.018)
Change laws to allow more construction (local)	-0.10 (0.023)	-0.20 (0.023)	0.10 (0.019)
Give neighborhoods more voice (local)	-0.01 (0.018)	-0.07 (0.019)	0.07 (0.017)
Allow development of open space (local)	-0.10 (0.023)	-0.14 (0.023)	0.04 (0.020)
Relax environmental limits (state)	-0.01 (0.021)	-0.01 (0.022)	0.00 (0.017)

Table 2: Contrasts in support for various housing-related policy proposals, by homeownership and support for a federal housing guarantee. Point estimates for pro-guarantee (“liberal”) and anti-guarantee (“conservative”) homeowners reflect differences in the proportion supporting a policy relative to liberal renters. We also report the difference of these two coefficients. Estimates are drawn from a linear probability model that controls accounts for basic demographics and contains the interaction between homeownership and support for a federal housing guarantee. Standard errors are reported in parentheses (Zeileis, 2004).

covariates, \mathbf{X}_i , includes age, race, sex, and income.¹³ The reference category was constructed to represent liberal (pro-housing guarantee) renters who should be the least conflicted by any policies intending to increase housing affordability. The results for conservative homeowners, and liberal homeowners are reported relative to this base group.

¹³We exclude partisanship from this analysis, as it complicates interpretation of coefficients on the ideological variables. The Online Appendix (p. 3) provides variable coding details.

Table 2 presents contrasts between liberal and conservative homeowners, on the one hand, and liberal renters, on the other. It also shows the difference between liberal and conservative homeowners in the right-most column, along with associated standard errors.¹⁴ The items are reported in descending order as a function of the gap between liberal and conservative homeowners. The table clearly reveals that, regardless of ideology, homeowners differ from renters on most proposed housing affordability policies. Liberal and conservative homeowners differ the most on programs designed to help renters directly, and these also least threaten neighborhood quality of life and home values. In contrast, both liberal and conservative homeowners adopt much more similar attitudes towards policies that would facilitate local development. The first few rows of the table include regulatory and redistributive policies such as housing vouchers, rent control, and renters' tax credits that do not jeopardize homeowners' economic self-interest. On these items, there is a large difference in opinions between pro- and anti-housing guarantee homeowners. Liberals and conservatives differ less over whether local governments should allow construction of more apartment buildings or be required by their state government to do so. Liberals offer more support for such development policies than do conservatives, but the homeowner-renter gap remains substantial. The last several policy ideas present more mixed results. All respondents—liberals and conservatives, homeowners and renters—support giving neighborhoods more voice and oppose relaxing environmental limits.

While these cross-sectional analyses do not indicate the causal influence of ideology and homeownership, they present the challenges of building a coalition in support of additional housing development. While homeowners are divided ideologically, and liberal homeowners are likely to provide some backing for housing aid policies, they are especially averse to development and mandates on development. Are such differences persistent, and is it possible to change homeowner attitudes by persuading them of housing development's effects on housing affordability?

¹⁴Full regression tables appear in the Online Appendix (p. 10).

Experiment 1: Assessing Support for Development of High- and Low-Density Housing Types

Our first survey experiment tests whether messages that highlight development’s importance to housing affordability—which are used often in pro-housing development campaigns—change attitudes as expected. Respondents were randomly assigned to view one of several statements regarding the price effects of housing development and the possible benefits for lower- and middle-income families. These claims were attributed to experts (economists) and written to emulate messages used in housing development campaigns. Respondents were then asked to state their support for five different forms of housing, ranging from apartment buildings to single-family homes with large yards.

To assess how respondents’ attitudes on local housing development shift in response to specific economic messages, we presented respondents a direct statement about experts’ (economists’) beliefs about the influence of additional housing development on housing prices. This message varied to emphasize (or omit) the benefits of additional housing development for low- and middle-income families. The four treatments included a no-information (“control”) condition, and three different active treatments that explain how building more housing in an area can reduce local housing costs:¹⁵

- *Expert*: “Economists have shown that building more housing in an area can reduce housing prices.” This treatment aimed to highlight the association between increased housing supply and housing prices, without mentioning any other factors. We expected that it would increase support for housing development among renters, and possibly reduce support among homeowners.
- *Expert, with “Escape Clause” Language*: “Economists have shown that building more housing in an area can reduce housing prices. Of course, housing prices are not the only issue affecting communities.” The added “escape clause” was an attempt to offset experimenter demand effects and invite respondents to simultaneously internalize and disregard our message (Zizzo, 2010).

¹⁵One-fifth of the sample did not receive a prompt or view the housing construction questions, but did answer all remaining survey questions.

We expected that the effect of the escape clause would be largest among liberal homeowners potentially subjected to cognitive dissonance.

- *Expert, with Additional Equality Language*: “Economists have shown that building more housing in an area can reduce housing prices. This can make communities more affordable to low-income and middle-income families.” This message linked market effects of additional housing supply to respondents’ support for economic redistribution. We expected that the additional equality message would boost support for dense housing among liberals relative to the control condition and the basic *expert* condition.

Respondents were then asked to indicate their level of support for the additional building of the five different housing types in their area: “Thinking about the possibility of more housing development in your area, do you support or oppose constructing more. . .”

- Apartment-only buildings
- Buildings that have both apartments and business spaces
- Multi-family housing (for example, townhomes or duplexes)
- Single-family houses in high-density subdivisions (small yards with neighboring houses close together)
- Single-family houses in low-density subdivisions (large yards with neighboring houses far apart)¹⁶

Individuals provided responses on a five-point Likert scale, and we analyze responses by treating these as continuous outcome variables.¹⁷

Table 3 presents the support level under the no-information condition (first column) and average treatment effect under the three active treatment conditions, along with standard errors. To simplify

¹⁶This exactly replicates language used in an April 2015 Hoover Institution poll (Hoover Institution, 2015).

¹⁷Dichotomizing the outcome variables does not change our substantive conclusions.

reporting, we report (1) support for apartment-only buildings, the greatest threat to homeowner self-interest and (2) single-family houses in low-density subdivisions, which represent a minimal threat.¹⁸ By analyzing different housing types, we were able to assess the degree to which the magnitude of the threat to self-interest interacted with support for housing for all.

Our results (top panel) demonstrate that most liberal homeowners do not support apartment housing development, and reminding them of development's effects on prices prompts them to behave identically to more conservative homeowners. First, when not provided any information, liberal homeowners were on average split over whether to support additional apartment construction, expressing average support of 3.05 on a one-to-five scale. Conservative homeowners stated slightly less support (2.69). The "economist" (supply and demand) treatment had no effect on the already low support of conservative homeowners, but reduced liberal homeowners' support by 0.35 points ($p < .01$). This effect of -0.25 standard deviation fully eliminates the gap between liberal and conservative homeowners. Adding escape-clause language removed most of the negative effect of the "economist" treatment among liberal homeowners, while adding information about additional housing's benefits to "families" increased support more, but only to the point of restoring it to the same level as in the no-information group. As expected, support for apartment development among renters was greater at baseline, and the informational treatment had little additional effect on attitudes. Liberal and conservative renters both supported apartment development, and the various treatments mostly had minimal effects.¹⁹

In contrast, the bottom panel of Table 3 displays the effects of our treatment on levels of support for low-density single-family housing, the most widely preferred housing form. Construction of additional low-density single-family housing won broad support from liberals and conservatives, homeowners and

¹⁸In the April 2015 Hoover Institution Golden State Poll on which our questions were based, large majorities of liberals and conservatives endorsed building of low-density single-family homes.

¹⁹A key exception is that the "escape clause" language reduced support for apartments among anti-guarantee renters. It is possible this language encouraged them to consider issues other than housing costs, prompting them to consider negative features of apartment buildings.

Support for Apartment-Only Buildings (High Threat to Homeowner Self-Interest)

Ideology	Homeownership	<u>Outcome Mean</u>	<u>Average Treatment Effect</u>		
		No-Info	Economist	Economist + Escape	Economist + Families
Homeowners:	Pro-Guarantee	3.05	-0.31 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.12)
	Anti-Guarantee	2.69	0.04 (0.11)	0.00 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.11)
	Pro-Anti Difference	0.35 (0.11)	-0.35 (0.16)	-0.11 (0.16)	0.04 (0.16)
Renters:	Pro-Guarantee	3.4	0.10 (0.12)	-0.019 (0.11)	0.172 (0.11)
	Anti-Guarantee	3.47	-0.13 (0.16)	-0.37 (0.18)	-0.18 (0.15)
	Pro-Anti Difference	-0.06 (0.14)	0.23 (0.20)	0.35 (0.21)	0.35 (0.19)

Support for Low-Density Single-Family Housing (Low Threat to Homeowner Self-Interest)

Ideology	Homeownership	<u>Outcome Mean</u>	<u>Average Treatment Effect</u>		
		No-Info	Economist	Economist + Escape	Economist + Families
Homeowners:	Pro-Guarantee	3.87	0.01 (0.10)	0.12 (0.09)	0.00 (0.10)
	Anti-Guarantee	3.93	-0.16 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.10)
	Pro-Anti Difference	-0.06 (0.10)	0.17 (0.14)	0.13 (0.13)	0.10 (0.14)
Renters:	Pro-Guarantee	3.93	-0.06 (0.10)	0.043 (0.10)	-0.116 (0.10)
	Anti-Guarantee	3.95	-0.06 (0.15)	-0.20 (0.16)	-0.19 (0.15)
	Pro-Anti Difference	-0.02 (0.13)	0.00 (0.18)	0.25 (0.19)	0.07 (0.18)

Table 3: Effect of various economic messages on support for apartment-only buildings (top) and low-density single-family housing (bottom) among metropolitan residents. Outcomes and average treatment effects are expressed on the five-point Likert scale.

renters. Additional informational and persuasive messages had no detectable effect on the uniformly high support levels for any of the groups.²⁰

A concern in this analysis is that our interpretation of self-interest is too focused on economics, in that what might appear to be economically motivated self-interest instead conceals discriminatory preferences over racial composition. We do not regard racial bias and economic considerations as mutually exclusive: respondent racial attitudes are likely to be incorporated into home-value concerns; their perceived threats to self-interest are no less real for being motivated by perceptions of racial threat. In assessing the role of self-interest, many factors feed into the perception of threats to home values, and previous research suggests that preferences for racially homogeneous neighborhoods can be motivated by concern over home values and neighborhood trajectory, versus racism directed towards persons (Ellen, 2000). This is, of course, a finely parsed distinction the disposition of this question does not affect inferences related to homeowner self-interest and dense housing.

We find that racial attitudes are only a partial factor in respondents' reaction to apartment buildings. To measure racial stereotyping, we asked respondents a battery of three standard questions on black racial stereotypes (Peffley, Hurwitz and Sniderman, 1997). If respondents endorsed at least one of these negative stereotypes, we code them as having negative affect towards blacks. To measure the association between racial animus and support for dense housing, we focused on the apartment outcomes presented in Experiment 1. We regressed support for building more apartments on the experimental conditions, plus a host of pre-treatment variables that included race and racial affect. The results, which are presented in full the Online Appendix (p. 12), are mixed. Respondent race was not a significant predictor of

²⁰One point of concern is that those who distrusted economists (or experts generally) would not have responded positively and might have responded expressively (and negatively) to our treatments. In the Online Appendix (p. 12), we address this point on a Mechanical Turk sample. We found that those who distrusted economists were less responsive to the manipulation. However, we found that the manipulation was effective, increasing by 10 percentage points the proportion identifying the correct expert position. In our manipulation check, the study increased by 6 percentage points the proportion of respondents who themselves believed adding housing supply would reduce housing prices.

opposition to apartments, but the indicator for negative racial affect was. Accounting for homeownership, ideology, income, race, sex, and age, people who endorsed a negative stereotype about blacks expressed 0.11 units lower support (on the 1-5 scale) than people who did not endorse such stereotypes. This is a small difference relative to the -0.35 point difference associated with owning versus renting. Even when we limited the analysis to liberal (pro-guarantee) homeowners, the coefficient magnitude was similar.

Experiment 2: Testing NIMBY Attitudes as a Function of Ideology

Whereas in Experiment 1 we used persuasive informational messages to shift stated support for different housing forms, in Experiment 2 we manipulated information pertaining to a hypothetical localized threat to self-interest: a proposed 120-unit apartment project in one's community. We randomized the nature of this threat, varying each project's proximity to the respondent's home and whether units would be rented at a market rate, or if half would be given to housing voucher recipients. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions:

- *Control (No-Information)*: A generic description of a 120-unit apartment building, specifying neither distance nor the tenants served.
- *Low-Income*: The same 120-unit apartment, with 50% of units occupied by low-income housing voucher recipients. Distance was not specified.
- *Low-Income, Quarter Mile*: 50% of units occupied by voucher recipients, located one-quarter mile away
- *Low-Income, Two Miles*: 50% of units occupied by voucher recipients, located two miles away.
- *Market Rate, Quarter Mile*: Apartments rented at a market rate, located one-quarter mile away.
- *Market Rate, Two Miles*: Apartments rented at a market rate, located two miles away.

Support for Proposal to Build 120-Unit Apartment Building

Ideology	Homeownership	Outcome Mean No Info	Average Treatment Effect				
			Low Inc., No Dist.	Low Inc., 1/4 Mile	Low Inc., 2 Miles	Mkt. Rate, 1/4 Mile	Mkt. Rate, 2 Miles
Homeowners:	Pro-Guarantee	2.89	0.13 (0.13)	0.17 (0.13)	0.28 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.13)	0.06 (0.13)
	Anti-Guarantee	2.61	-0.27 (0.12)	-0.32 (0.12)	-0.19 (0.11)	-0.23 (0.12)	0.36 (0.12)
	Pro-Anti Difference	0.28 (0.13)	0.41 (0.18)	0.49 (0.18)	0.47 (0.17)	0.11 (0.18)	-0.30 (0.18)
Renters:	Pro-Guarantee	3.68	-0.06 (0.13)	-0.28 (0.13)	0.105 (0.12)	-0.22 (0.12)	-0.39 (0.12)
	Anti-Guarantee	3.02	0.03 (0.18)	-0.36 (0.18)	-0.03 (0.18)	0.16 (0.18)	0.06 (0.18)
	Pro-Anti Difference	0.66 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.22)	0.08 (0.22)	0.14 (0.22)	-0.38 (0.22)	-0.45 (0.22)

Table 4: Differences in stated support for different hypothetical apartment proposals (on a 5-point scale), by homeownership status and support for a federal housing guarantee. ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

The outcome variable is again a 5-point support-oppose Likert scale indicating support or opposition.²¹

Table 4 displays how homeownership and support for a federal housing guarantee interacted in response to various apartment development scenarios. We again find evidence that homeowners are less supportive than renters, regardless of their attitudes towards a federal housing guarantee. Conservative homeowners consistently opposed all varieties of apartment housing (except for far-away, market-rate apartments). Liberal homeowners were slightly more supportive, but this varied slightly depending on the types of tenants served. In the no-information (control) condition, average support for a generic 120-unit apartment building was 2.61. Describing the apartment building as being occupied by housing voucher recipients (without any distance-to-project information) decreased support to 2.33 ($p = .02$, two-tailed test with robust standard errors). The only proposal with higher support than the control condition was a market rate apartment building two miles away, which garnered average support of 2.97 ($p < .01$).

²¹Our design emulates key features of a survey experiment presented in Hankinson (2018). Several of the possible treatment arms in a full-factorial design were excluded to preserve power. We can still test important pairwise hypotheses regarding interaction of ideology and homeownership.

Pro-guarantee (liberal) homeowners were slightly more supportive of apartment housing, but remained substantially less supportive than renters. Average support for a generic (control-condition) 120-unit apartment building was 2.89, with roughly 40% of pro-guarantee homeowners answering that they would “somewhat” or “strongly” support such a proposal. Liberal homeowners were slightly more support of housing occupied by voucher recipients. Relative to the control condition, pro-guarantee homeowners’ support increased by 0.17 ($p < .1$) and 0.28 points ($p = .03$), respectively, for developments located a quarter mile or two miles from their home.

Liberals’ increased support for low-income apartments requires some explanation, which cannot be entirely resolved by our experiment. Liberal homeowners asked about an apartment “in their community” in the abstract may have inferred higher risks in the absence of information. To be clear, even the low-income apartments in our design were mixed income: voucher recipients would occupy only half the units, which may have been a less threatening. However, this still indicates that liberal homeowners are more tolerant of voucher recipients than they are of market-rate housing. Another possible explanation is that the responses we observe are expressive: liberals asked about housing for low-income persons give an ideologically correct answer. This may be driven, in part, by social desirability. It is noteworthy that even social desirability bias is insufficient to lead liberal homeowners to state as much support for low-income housing as much as liberal renters do.

In summary, conservative homeowners—who opposed a federal housing guarantee—were consistently anti-apartment, whereas liberal homeowners were more receptive. Still, across pro-guarantee positions, pro-guarantee homeowners never expressed net positive support for any of the proposals.

Conclusion

Are Americans blinded to self-interest when they form their policy attitudes? Previous work has suggested that economic self-interest has little bearing on vote choice or on many policy attitudes. Scholarship built on this research often neglects an important proviso: that threats to self-interest that are objectively large and appear in Americans’ daily lives can lead to strong political expressions of self-interest (Citrin and Green, 1990). Our results demonstrate that homeownership is an important manifestation

of economic self-interest, and that Americans, and especially liberals, disregard their own ideological principles when presented options that sufficiently threaten their economic interests. But, in addition to revealing that the scale of an economic threat matters, our results also capture how self-interest can yield different attitudes towards dissimilar policies presented in pursuit of a common social objective. Homeowners who support a federal housing guarantee express moderate support for programs that aid renters, as these programs disperse costs to taxpayers and pose little threat to their home values or quality of life. Development raises a different, and more stark, set of concerns around self-interest.

Our two survey experiments confirm consistent differences between renters and homeowners, regardless of their ideology. When we prompted liberal homeowners to think about the market implications of building more housing in their area, their support for apartment development declined so much that liberal homeowners became indistinguishable from conservative homeowners. Additionally reminding liberal homeowners of the welfare implications of new housing offset the negative effects of our initial supply-and-demand message but did not increase net support. When we presented more specific hypothetical housing proposals in our second experiment, we again found a large homeowner-renter gap, with indications that we were able to manipulate or persuade homeowners and renters in ways that appeared to induce cognitive dissonance. Indeed, ideology does, at times, appear to clash with self-interest. Only a minority of liberal homeowners supported our hypothetical apartment scenario, unless voucher recipients occupied half the apartments. Even then, support among liberal homeowners remained tepid.

Much of the work on the weak link between economic self-interest and partisanship has argued that, to the extent Americans have coherent ideological schemas, they are based on partisan heuristics (Sniderman and Stiglitz, 2012) or partisan elite cues (Lenz, 2013). It often appears as if partisanship as a social identity has become so strong as to swamp the expression of economic self-interest in American politics (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Mason, 2015). However, to attribute self-interest's minimal influence on politics to partisanship is to neglect that the stakes posed by tax and social policy legislation. The same applies to choices brought before voters regarding social policy solutions to the housing affordability crisis: they benefit served groups without

imposing sharp costs on homeowners (in their role as taxpayers or as property investors). Housing development is needed, but presents much higher stakes for homeowners.

Our results shed light on the cognitive dissonance that citizens may experience around the personally costly local implementation of policies that they generally support. Increasing the local housing supply is likely to depress neighborhood home values, presenting an objectively large threat to homeowners' self-interest. Whereas this self-interest appears to have little additional effect on already conservative homeowners, liberal homeowners face conflicting considerations. In fact, by reminding them of housing prices, we can cause them to behave much like conservative homeowners. At the same time, reminding them of the redistributive benefits for lower and middle-income families does increase their support slightly, but not enough to produce consistently positive support. We also suspect that many liberal homeowners avoid cognitive dissonance altogether by adopting a default opposition against development-based threats to their neighborhood. While the ideal of equality of opportunity is appealing, the utility that homeowners derive from seeing redistributive policy enacted stops where it affects their own quality of life.

Our results also reveal that the politics of housing do not neatly fit onto the customary left-right scale. The politics of housing are concerned with geographic access to economic opportunity. On the question of allowing housing development, adherence to the *principle* of housing for all only weakly correlates with support for the local housing development program needed to pursue it. Our findings also counter much of the conventional wisdom about liberals' support for urbanism. While liberals have been shown to express a stronger taste for dense urban neighborhoods on surveys (Pew Research Center, 2014), they need not support *building* of additional urban housing forms in their communities. If they are homeowners, they are especially likely to oppose measures that might urbanize their communities.

Our nationalized partisan environment (Hopkins, 2018) does little to shape debates over high-stakes local housing questions. Indeed, a likely cause of the disconnect between economic liberalism and support for housing development is that party elites—especially Democrats—have shied away from making housing development a national issue precisely because it exposes their more affluent constituents to risk. On issues from abortion to taxation, cross-pressured voters must choose between two parties. The

pro-life economic liberal or the economically conservative social liberal faces a choice based on issue ownership of national issues (Petrocik, 1996). The absence of any linkage between housing development and national party politics means that Americans lack usually useful partisan heuristics for determining the correct position (Sniderman and Stiglitz, 2012). Recent policy debates in California and elsewhere suggest that, in the absence of clear party position taking, the liberal electorate's divisions are likely to remain.

Finally, our study develops insights for housing policy advocates seeking to support or oppose housing development. Such advocates often believe that Americans' seemingly inconsistent views over housing policy is that homeowners are misinformed about the functioning of housing markets and that, if only they were educated about the merits of development or reminded of development's relevance to equal housing opportunity, they would see the need for more housing construction in their area. Our results confirm political scientists' skepticism about the value of corrective education (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). Our survey experiment conducted in national metropolitan areas offers little hope that exposing voters to more expert information or facts about housing markets will meaningfully shift attitudes towards more support for housing development. Even if economic self-interest does not fully overcome ideological principle, homeownership is a high-stakes investment that prompts Americans to perceive threats of sufficient magnitude that their other commitments become, at best, secondary considerations.

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Online Appendix for “Where Self-Interest Trumps
Ideology: Liberal Homeowners and Local Opposition to
Housing Development”

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Survey Question Wording

Exact wordings for survey questions referenced in the paper, along with recoding rules, are listed here.

Age. *What is your age group?*

- *Under 18*
- *18-24 years*
- *25-34 years*
- *35-44 years*
- *45-54 years*
- *55-64 years*
- *65-74 years*
- *75 years and up*

Income. *Now, for statistical purposes only, we have a question about your income. Last year (in 2016), what was your total family income from all sources, before taxes.*

- *Less than 15,000*
- *\$15,000 - 24,999*
- *\$25,000 - 34,999*
- *\$35,000 - 49,999*
- *\$50,000 74,999*
- *\$75,000 99,999*
- *\$100,000 - 119,999*
- *\$120,000 - 149,999*
- *\$150,000 or greater*

For those who answered above \$150,000, we asked a follow-up question: *We see you make over \$150,000. Can you tell us which best represents your total family income before taxes?*

- *\$150,000-\$199,999*
- *\$200,000-\$299,999*
- *\$300,000-\$399,999*
- *\$400,000 or greater*

- *Prefer not to answer*

In analyses, we code income to be the midpoint of each category, with a top-code of \$425,000 and a bottom-code of \$10,000.

Federal Housing Guarantee. *Some people say the federal government should ensure that all Americans have housing. Others say that shouldn't be a concern of the federal government.*

- *1–Yes, the federal government should ensure that all Americans have housing*
- *2*
- *3*
- *4*
- *5–No, ensuring all Americans have housing should not be a concern of the federal government*

We code people as “pro-housing-guarantee” if they respond 1 or 2 and “anti-housing-guarantee” otherwise.

Homeownership. *Which of the following most closely describes your current housing?*

- *I own it*
- *I rent it*
- *I neither own nor rent it (live with a home owner)*

When we refer to “renters,” we group together all people who do not own their home.

Race/Ethnicity. *What is your race/ethnicity? (Please select all that apply.)*

- *White/Caucasian*
- *Black/African American*
- *Hispanic/Latino*
- *Asian*
- *Native American*
- *Pacific Islander*
- *Other*

In analyses and in quota sampling, we collapse the responses to the following categories: White, Black, Asian, Hispanic/Latino, and Other.

Gender. *What is your gender?*

- *Male*
- *Female*

- *Neither of these apply*
- *I prefer not to answer*

Education. *What is the highest level of education you have completed?*

- *Less than High School*
- *High School / GED*
- *Some College*
- *2-year College Degree*
- *4-year College Degree*
- *Masters Degree*
- *Doctoral Degree*
- *Professional Degree (JD, MD)*

In analyses, we include an indicator for having at least a 4-year college degree.

Policy Changes. We analyze attitudes on a variety of potential policy changes. We asked respondents to indicate whether they *Strongly support*, *somewhat support*, *Neither support nor oppose*, *Somewhat oppose* or *Strongly oppose* a series of potential changes to state or local policy. We code responses as 1 if they *Strongly support* or *Somewhat support* the policy change, and 0 otherwise.

Some people have proposed public policies that would affect housing in your state. Considering a few of these ideas, do you support or oppose your state...

- *Relaxing environmental limits to allow building of more housing*
- *Financing regional public transportation systems to enable people to live farther from work*
- *Providing additional tax credits for renters*
- *Requiring landlords to accept tenants who use low-income (Section 8) vouchers to pay rent*
- *Requiring local governments to allow more apartment housing*
- *Fining landlords and real estate agents that discriminate by race or ethnicity*

Do you support or oppose your local government...

- *Allowing more housing to be built in undeveloped open space*
- *Changing residential and business zoning laws to allow more housing construction*
- *Passing rent control*
- *Supporting expansion of bus or rail service in my community*
- *Giving neighborhoods more voice over development proposals*

Survey Quota Targets

We recruited a sample of $N = 4,000$ respondents from the largest 20 Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the United States using Qualtrics's online panel. As noted in the main text, we quote-sampled to match the within-Census region marginal distributions on the following variables: age (18-24, 25-44, 45-64 and 65+), sex, race/ethnicity (Asian only, black only, non-Hispanic white only, Hispanic, and multiracial/other), income (5 categories with a top code at \$75,000 per year), and MSA. The following table shows the requested quotas alongside the actual sample.

<u>Region</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Pct</u>	<u>Target Pct</u>	<u>Target N</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Diff (%)</u>	<u>Abs Diff (%)</u>	<u>Abs Diff (N)</u>
Midwest	AGE: 18 - 24	84	12%	13%	87	-1%	-3	1%	3
Midwest	AGE: 25 - 44	245	35%	35%	237	0%	8	0%	8
Midwest	AGE: 45 - 64	244	35%	35%	239	0%	5	0%	5
Midwest	AGE: 65+	128	18%	18%	121	1%	7	1%	7
Midwest	INCOME: \$15,000 to \$24,999	60	9%	8%	55	0%	5	0%	5
Midwest	INCOME: \$25,000 to \$34,999	81	12%	11%	78	0%	3	0%	3
Midwest	INCOME: \$35,000 to \$49,999	94	13%	13%	91	0%	3	0%	3
Midwest	INCOME: \$50,000 to \$74,999	130	19%	19%	127	0%	3	0%	3
Midwest	INCOME: \$75,000 to \$99,999+	267	38%	38%	260	0%	7	0%	7
Midwest	INCOME: Under \$15,000	69	10%	11%	73	-1%	-4	1%	4
Midwest	MSA: Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI	350	50%	47%	323	3%	27	3%	27
Midwest	MSA: Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI	144	21%	23%	154	-2%	-10	2%	10
Midwest	MSA: Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI	127	18%	17%	113	2%	14	2%	14
Midwest	MSA: St. Louis, MO-IL	80	11%	14%	94	-2%	-14	2%	14
Midwest	RACE: asian only	41	6%	6%	39	0%	2	0%	2
Midwest	RACE: black only	113	16%	16%	110	0%	3	0%	3
Midwest	RACE: hispanic	69	10%	10%	67	0%	2	0%	2
Midwest	RACE: other/multiracial	12	2%	2%	11	0%	1	0%	1
Midwest	RACE: white only	466	66%	67%	458	0%	8	0%	8
Midwest	SEX: Female	363	52%	52%	354	0%	9	0%	9
Midwest	SEX: Male	334	48%	48%	330	-1%	4	1%	4
Midwest		4	1%			1%	4	1%	4
Northeast	AGE: 18 - 24	116	12%	12%	115	0%	1	0%	1
Northeast	AGE: 25 - 44	339	35%	35%	330	0%	9	0%	9
Northeast	AGE: 45 - 64	337	35%	35%	328	0%	9	0%	9
Northeast	AGE: 65+	176	18%	18%	172	0%	4	0%	4
Northeast	INCOME: \$15,000 to \$24,999	60	6%	7%	63	0%	-3	0%	3
Northeast	INCOME: \$25,000 to \$34,999	83	9%	10%	91	-1%	-8	1%	8
Northeast	INCOME: \$35,000 to \$49,999	124	13%	13%	120	0%	4	0%	4
Northeast	INCOME: \$50,000 to \$74,999	161	17%	17%	156	0%	5	0%	5
Northeast	INCOME: \$75,000 to \$99,999+	468	48%	44%	412	5%	56	5%	56
Northeast	INCOME: Under \$15,000	72	7%	11%	102	-3%	-30	3%	30
Northeast	MSA: Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH	138	14%	13%	126	1%	12	1%	12

<u>Region</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Pct</u>	<u>Target Pct</u>	<u>Target N</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Diff (%)</u>	<u>Abs Diff (%)</u>	<u>Abs Diff (N)</u>
Northeast	MSA: New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA	579	60%	56%	531	4%	48	4%	48
Northeast	MSA: Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE	251	26%	31%	288	-5%	-37	5%	37
Northeast	RACE: asian only	86	9%	9%	83	0%	3	0%	3
Northeast	RACE: black only	145	15%	15%	141	0%	4	0%	4
Northeast	RACE: hispanic	147	15%	15%	143	0%	4	0%	4
Northeast	RACE: other/multiracial	19	2%	2%	19	0%	0	0%	0
Northeast	RACE: white only	571	59%	59%	560	0%	11	0%	11
Northeast	SEX: Female	494	51%	52%	489	-1%	5	1%	5
Northeast	SEX: Male	468	48%	48%	456	0%	12	0%	12
Northeast		6	1%			1%	6	1%	6
South	AGE: 18 - 24	93	8%	12%	140	-4%	-47	4%	47
South	AGE: 25 - 44	481	41%	39%	469	2%	12	2%	12
South	AGE: 45 - 64	395	34%	32%	385	1%	10	1%	10
South	AGE: 65+	198	17%	16%	193	1%	5	1%	5
South	INCOME: \$15,000 to \$24,999	94	8%	8%	99	0%	-5	0%	5
South	INCOME: \$25,000 to \$34,999	121	10%	10%	118	0%	3	0%	3
South	INCOME: \$35,000 to \$49,999	151	13%	12%	147	1%	4	1%	4
South	INCOME: \$50,000 to \$74,999	208	18%	17%	203	1%	5	1%	5
South	INCOME: \$75,000 to \$99,999+	506	43%	42%	493	2%	13	2%	13
South	INCOME: Under \$15,000	87	7%	11%	127	-3%	-40	3%	40
South	MSA: Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA	177	15%	13%	159	2%	18	2%	18
South	MSA: Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX	232	20%	17%	201	3%	31	3%	31
South	MSA: Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX	200	17%	16%	188	1%	12	1%	12
South	MSA: Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach,	204	17%	16%	188	2%	16	2%	16
South	MSA: Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL	110	9%	7%	85	2%	25	2%	25
South	MSA: Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD	244	21%	31%	365	-10%	-121	10%	121
South	RACE: asian only	73	6%	6%	71	0%	2	0%	2
South	RACE: black only	286	25%	23%	279	1%	7	1%	7
South	RACE: hispanic	251	22%	21%	244	1%	7	1%	7
South	RACE: other/multiracial	30	3%	2%	29	0%	1	0%	1
South	RACE: white only	527	45%	48%	565	-2%	-38	2%	38
South	SEX: Female	630	54%	52%	614	2%	16	2%	16
South	SEX: Male	536	46%	48%	573	-2%	-37	2%	37

<u>Region</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Pct</u>	<u>Target Pct</u>	<u>Target N</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Diff (%)</u>	<u>Abs Diff (%)</u>	<u>Abs Diff (N)</u>
South		1	0%			0%	1	0%	1
West	AGE: 18 - 24	131	11%	0.1276	151	-2%	-20	2%	20
West	AGE: 25 - 44	456	38%	0.3749	444	1%	12	1%	12
West	AGE: 45 - 64	402	34%	0.3304	391	1%	11	1%	11
West	AGE: 65+	202	17%	0.167	198	0%	4	0%	4
West	INCOME: \$15,000 to \$24,999	108	9%	0.0774	92	1%	16	1%	16
West	INCOME: \$25,000 to \$34,999	134	11%	0.1149	136	0%	-2	0%	2
West	INCOME: \$35,000 to \$49,999	161	14%	0.1322	157	0%	4	0%	4
West	INCOME: \$50,000 to \$74,999	203	17%	0.167	198	0%	5	0%	5
West	INCOME: \$75,000 to \$99,999+	484	41%	0.3986	472	1%	12	1%	12
West	INCOME: Under \$15,000	101	8%	0.1099	130	-3%	-29	3%	29
West		2	0%	0		0%	2	0%	2
West	MSA: Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO	90	8%	0.0769	91	0%	-1	0%	1
West	MSA: Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA	455	38%	0.3639	431	2%	24	2%	24
West	MSA: Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ	152	13%	0.1166	138	1%	14	1%	14
West	MSA: Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA	142	12%	0.1174	139	0%	3	0%	3
West	MSA: San Diego-Carlsbad, CA	102	9%	0.0836	99	0%	3	0%	3
West	MSA: San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA	143	12%	0.138	163	-2%	-20	2%	20
West	MSA: Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA	105	9%	0.1037	123	-2%	-18	2%	18
West	RACE: asian only	161	14%	0.1326	157	0%	4	0%	4
West	RACE: black only	76	6%	0.0624	74	0%	2	0%	2
West	RACE: hispanic	359	30%	0.2954	350	1%	9	1%	9
West	RACE: other/multiracial	58	5%	0.0472	56	0%	2	0%	2
West	RACE: white only	537	45%	0.4624	547	-1%	-10	1%	10
West	SEX: Female	621	52%	0.5108	605	1%	16	1%	16
West	SEX: Male	564	47%	0.4892	579	-2%	-15	2%	15
West		6	1%			1%	6	1%	6
MEAN ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE								1%	12.44

Observational Regression Tables

Here we report the full regression results predicting support for local and state policy changes. These regression tables correspond to the models summarized in Table 2. Each column corresponds to a different policy outcome, in the following order:

Model 1: Combating housing discrimination (state)

Model 2: Giving neighborhoods more voice (local)

Model 3: Relax environmental limits (state)

Model 4: Require accepting Section 8 tenants (state)

Model 5: Passing rent control (local)

Model 6: Tax credits for renters (state)

Model 7: Allowing development of open space (local)

Model 8: Changing laws to allow more construction (local)

Model 9: Require local governments to allow more apartment construction (state)

The estimates are presented in Table A-1.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Constant	0.610*** (0.026)	0.760*** (0.024)	0.355*** (0.027)	0.647*** (0.027)	0.644*** (0.028)	0.608*** (0.028)	0.611*** (0.028)	0.452*** (0.028)	0.597*** (0.028)
Anti-housing-guarantee	-0.147*** (0.025)	-0.111*** (0.024)	-0.0001 (0.025)	-0.273*** (0.026)	-0.149*** (0.026)	-0.156*** (0.026)	-0.106*** (0.027)	-0.109*** (0.027)	-0.205*** (0.026)
Homeowner	-0.042** (0.019)	-0.007 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.021)	-0.063*** (0.023)	-0.093*** (0.022)	-0.220*** (0.022)	-0.099*** (0.023)	-0.099*** (0.023)	-0.148*** (0.023)
Age: 25-34	-0.001 (0.029)	-0.012 (0.027)	0.018 (0.030)	0.010 (0.030)	0.099*** (0.031)	0.073** (0.031)	0.010 (0.031)	0.033 (0.031)	-0.052* (0.031)
Age: 35-44	0.034 (0.029)	0.020 (0.026)	-0.034 (0.030)	-0.025 (0.031)	0.107*** (0.031)	0.082*** (0.031)	-0.055* (0.031)	0.008 (0.031)	-0.086*** (0.031)
Age: 45-54	0.078** (0.030)	0.029 (0.028)	-0.026 (0.031)	-0.052 (0.032)	0.061* (0.032)	0.114*** (0.032)	-0.024 (0.032)	0.026 (0.033)	-0.085*** (0.032)
Age: 55-64	0.087*** (0.030)	0.028 (0.027)	-0.099*** (0.030)	-0.064** (0.031)	0.052* (0.031)	0.059* (0.031)	-0.066** (0.032)	-0.024 (0.032)	-0.090*** (0.031)
Age: 65-74	0.129*** (0.030)	0.055** (0.028)	-0.127*** (0.031)	-0.045 (0.032)	0.057* (0.033)	0.037 (0.032)	-0.039 (0.033)	0.0003 (0.033)	-0.100*** (0.032)
Age: 75+	0.078 (0.048)	0.044 (0.045)	-0.239*** (0.038)	-0.057 (0.049)	-0.019 (0.049)	-0.028 (0.047)	-0.054 (0.053)	-0.072 (0.049)	-0.119*** (0.046)
Race: Black	0.039* (0.020)	0.028 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.021)	0.012 (0.023)	0.045* (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	0.128*** (0.023)	0.027 (0.023)	0.060*** (0.022)
Race: Hispanic	0.025 (0.019)	0.056*** (0.017)	0.055*** (0.020)	0.013 (0.020)	0.082*** (0.020)	0.054*** (0.020)	0.108*** (0.021)	0.052** (0.021)	0.043** (0.020)
Race: Asian	0.019 (0.025)	-0.012 (0.025)	0.027 (0.026)	0.017 (0.027)	0.021 (0.029)	0.034 (0.028)	0.082*** (0.029)	0.041 (0.029)	0.077*** (0.028)
Race: Other	0.064 (0.040)	-0.049 (0.043)	-0.020 (0.042)	-0.050 (0.045)	-0.067 (0.043)	0.026 (0.044)	0.022 (0.049)	-0.058 (0.045)	-0.043 (0.043)
Educ: BA or higher	0.051*** (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.051*** (0.016)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.022 (0.017)	0.017 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.017)	-0.016 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.016)
Male	0.022 (0.014)	-0.028** (0.013)	0.057*** (0.014)	0.034** (0.015)	-0.064*** (0.015)	0.026* (0.015)	0.052*** (0.016)	0.090*** (0.016)	0.056*** (0.015)
Income	0.001*** (0.0003)	0.001*** (0.0003)	-0.0004 (0.0003)	-0.001*** (0.0003)	-0.0002 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.001* (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0004 (0.0003)
Income squared	-0.00000*** (0.00000)	-0.00000** (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)
Homeowner × Anti-housing-guarantee	-0.003 (0.031)	0.044 (0.029)	-0.001 (0.031)	0.009 (0.032)	-0.080** (0.032)	-0.039 (0.032)	0.064* (0.033)	0.011 (0.033)	0.040 (0.032)
N	4055	4055	4055	4055	4055	4055	4055	4055	4055
R-squared	0.055	0.022	0.034	0.099	0.100	0.117	0.039	0.038	0.087

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A-1: Full regression results predicting support for changing various laws related to development. See appendix text for description of outcome variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Income is recorded in thousands of dollars.

Mechanical Turk Survey for Manipulation Checks and Trust in Economists

As noted in footnote 20 of the main text, we conducted a follow-up survey on Mechanical Turk to assess two possible explanations for our mostly null results. First, it might have been the case that our treatment primes were not sufficiently strong. Second, respondents may be skeptical of experts, which would dampen the effects of our primes which appeal to experts.

To test the first possibility, we took two approaches. We replicated the main experiment with the original “economist” prime, along with an extended “explanation” prime that explained the economic logic of why increasing housing supply should decrease prices. We expected that this prime would be stronger than a mere appeal to experts. Additionally, we included explicit manipulation checks to assess the effect of the primes on (a) respondents’ own beliefs about the relationship between housing development and prices and (b) respondents’ beliefs about what economists say on the same question. If the treatment prime is weak, then we will not be able to reject the null hypothesis that the treatment has no effect on these manipulation check measures.

To test the second possibility, we included the following question prior to the experiment:

“Which of the following statements best capture your view of economists? You may select more than one. (a) They’re generally unbiased (accurate and objective); (b) They’re often biased for business reasons; (c) They’re often biased for political reasons; (d) They’re often biased for some other reason.”

Respondents who selected any of the bias answers are classified as “low-trust,” while those who selected that economists are generally unbiased are classified as “high-trust.”

First, in Table A-2 we report the results of the manipulation checks, for the full sample and by the trust variable. Generally, the treatments had a small effect on respondents’ own beliefs but had a relatively large effect on their beliefs about economists’ views. We take this as evidence the treatments are informative, but that respondents are resistant to updating their own views.

Second, we report the results of the replication. Figure A-1 shows the same patterns of response among homeowners and renters that we document in the main text. More importantly, Figure A-2 shows the results split by trust in economists. Among people who think that economists are biased, we again see mostly null results. Among people who think economists are unbiased, however, the treatments appear to have a stronger effect. In particular, the primes induce people to decrease their support of low-density housing relative to the controls. Interestingly, the vanilla “economist” prime has a negative effect on support for building apartment-only buildings, but the “explanation” prime has a positive effect. It also has a positive effect on support for mixed-use housing and townhouses.

Racial Affect

Here we investigate the role of racial affect in shaping opinions towards construction of high-density housing. Table A-3 reports regression results from Experiment 1 predicting support for construction of apartment-only buildings. Covariates include the experimental condition, support for a federal housing guarantee, an indicator for endorsing negative stereotypes about blacks, and sociodemographic controls. Column 1 reports the results for the full sample, column 2 for liberal (pro-guarantee) homeowners, and column 3 for conservative (anti-guarantee) homeowners.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Respondent's Own Beliefs			Beliefs about economists		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Economist treatment	0.060* (0.035)	0.031 (0.064)	0.074* (0.042)	0.101*** (0.034)	0.055 (0.059)	0.121*** (0.041)
Explanation treatment	0.036 (0.035)	0.073 (0.062)	0.017 (0.042)	0.102*** (0.033)	0.104* (0.056)	0.098** (0.041)
Constant	0.460*** (0.025)	0.504*** (0.046)	0.440*** (0.030)	0.602*** (0.025)	0.669*** (0.043)	0.571*** (0.030)
Sample:	Full	High trust	Low trust	Full	High trust	Low trust
Observations	1,223	385	838	1,223	385	838
R ²	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.010	0.009	0.012

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A-2: The outcome variable is an indicator for whether respondents believe building more housing will reduce prices (columns 1-3) and whether respondents think that *economists* believe building more housing will reduce prices. The “low-trust” subsample includes people who said economists were biased in at least one way. The “high-trust” subsample includes people who did not indicate that they thought economists were biased. Models estimated via OLS.




Figure A-1: Support for building additional housing, by homeownership status. Source: Authors’ January 2018 MTurk study.




Figure A-2: Support for building additional housing, by trust in economists. Source: Authors' January 2018 MTurk study.

	Support for Building Apartments		
Condition: Economist	-0.049 (0.062)	-0.258** (0.114)	0.068 (0.115)
Condition: Economist/Escape	-0.081 (0.060)	-0.102 (0.108)	0.012 (0.110)
Condition: Economist/Families	0.005 (0.060)	-0.034 (0.114)	-0.029 (0.112)
Negative racial affect	-0.119*** (0.045)	-0.145* (0.086)	-0.150* (0.080)
Homeowner	-0.352*** (0.054)		
Anti-housing guarantee	-0.198*** (0.044)		
Nonwhite	-0.034 (0.044)	-0.069 (0.082)	0.020 (0.081)
Income: \$120k-149k	-0.084 (0.113)	-0.140 (0.192)	0.058 (0.165)
Income: \$15k-24k	0.231** (0.111)	0.129 (0.232)	0.363* (0.217)
Income: \$150k or greater	0.061 (0.102)	-0.002 (0.174)	0.044 (0.151)
Income: \$25k-34k	0.092 (0.108)	0.005 (0.217)	0.256 (0.214)
Income: \$35k-49k	0.154 (0.100)	-0.221 (0.182)	0.285* (0.166)
Income: \$50-74k	0.009 (0.096)	-0.135 (0.165)	0.176 (0.152)
Income: \$75k-99k	0.163 (0.100)	0.091 (0.167)	0.295* (0.152)
Income: Less than \$15k	0.179 (0.112)	0.136 (0.258)	-0.072 (0.312)
Educ: BA or higher	0.095** (0.047)	0.155* (0.089)	0.124 (0.083)
Age: 25-44	-0.277*** (0.074)	-0.475** (0.210)	-0.876*** (0.245)
Age: 45-64	-0.553*** (0.078)	-0.899*** (0.204)	-1.179*** (0.240)
Age: 65+	-0.687*** (0.086)	-0.956*** (0.212)	-1.322*** (0.240)
Constant	3.507*** (0.124)	3.792*** (0.259)	3.580*** (0.285)
Sample:	Full	Pro-guarantee homeowners	Anti-guarantee homeowners
Observations	3,264	970	1,014
R-squared	0.094	0.071	0.057

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A-3: Re-analysis of Experiment 1, including controls for demographics and racial affect. Outcome variable is support for building apartments on a 1-4 scale.